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In this paper, we investigate the location determinants of Spanish multinational firms in developing and 
transition economies. We pay particular attention to the role played by market potential and agglomeration 
economies as decisive factors in location. We also nalyse whether, beyond the observed attributes, thre 
are any significant differences across regions in terms of attracting foreign affiliates. With this aim, we 
estimate a mixed logit model, which allows us to endogenously consider the existence of complex 
substitution patterns among different destinations. Our results confirm that Spanish investment in 
developing and transition countries depends on market potential and agglomeration externalities. The 
intensity of these externalities, however, depends on the nationality of competitors, greater rivalry being 
observed among Spanish-owned affiliates. Furthermore, our findings show that the location of 
multinational firms responds both to factors related to the local business environment, including the cost 
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Over the last few decades, the world has witnessed a significant rise in the scale of 
multinational operations, which has been accompanied, at the same time, by a substantial 
change in the location patterns of their offshore activities. The notable reduction in the 
weight of traditional North-North flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in favour of 
North-South, and even South-South, flows appears as one of the most significant stylized 
facts of the last wave of globalization. In fact, inward FDI flows to developing and 
transition economies have been growing since the end of the last century (Barba-Navaretti 
and Venables, 2004), reaching their highest level in 2014, when they attracted nearly 60% 
of world FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2015).  
This rapid expansion of FDI has triggered a great deal of research into the factors 
underlying the investment location patterns of foreign affiliates of multinational firms 
(MNEs). However, in contrast to the recent trends, for a long time research remained 
focused on the location decisions of multinational firms in developed economies. This is 
the case of the studies conducted by, among others, Basile et al. (2008) for MNEs in 
Europe, Basile (2004) and Mariotti et al. (2010) for Italy, Crozet et al. (2004) for France, 
Duranton and Overman (2008) for United Kingdom, Guimares et al. (2000) for Portugal, 
and Head and Mayer (2004) for Japanese MNEs in Europe.1  
In this paper, we try to partially fill this gap by empirically investigating the factors that 
drive the location decisions of Spanish MNEs in developing and transition economies. . 
With this aim, we estimate a mixed logit model (MXL) applied to firm-level data for 
Spanish multinationals in developing and transitions economies from 1990 to 2010. 
Without ignoring the traditional determinants that explain the location of these offshore 
activities (such as labour cost, market size, distance, infrastructures or business 
environment), we mainly base our work on the predictions highlighted by the New 
Economic Geography (NEG) models applied to FDI. Specifically, we focus on the role 
played by market potential and agglomeration economies as decisive factors in choice of 
location. On the one hand, market potential highlights the fact that the relevant measure 
                                                          
1 There are some exceptions, however, such as Frenkel t al. (2004), who analyse the determinants of FDI 
from the five largest industrialized countries to a number of emerging economies in Asia, Latin America, 
and Central and Eastern Europe; Pusterla and Resmini (2007), who focus on the location decision of foreign 
firms in four Central and Eastern European Countries; or Rasciute et al. (2014), who studied the locati n 
decisions of firms from 20 OECD countries to 13 transition economies (CEECs). 
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of market size of a location is not limited to just it  own market, but extends to other 
nearby markets (Head and Mayer, 2004). On the other hand, the agglomeration economies 
allow us to consider the tendency towards the spatial clustering of MNEs in host markets. 
These agglomeration economies, associated with knowledge spillovers, availability of 
intermediate goods and services, labour market stability, etc., encourage multinational 
firms to locate where other firms are already placed (Head et al., 1995, 1999; Mariotti et 
al., 2010). 
Furthermore, we also take into account what Crozet et al. (2004) recently pointed out 
concerning the nationality of competitors. According to these authors, the agglomeration 
patterns of the foreign subsidiaries of MNEs are not only determined by the number of 
firms but also by their country of origin. Thus, we try to ascertain to what extent the 
nationality of competitors influences the intensity of these externalities. Finally, we 
analyse whether, apart from the observed attributes, th re are any significant differences 
across regions in terms of the attraction they hold f r Spanish foreign affiliates. 
From the methodological point of view, the use of mixed logit models methodology 
allows us to relax the restrictive substitution pattern of the standard logit models.2  By so 
doing, we can test for potential substitution patterns among alternatives and obtain more 
accurate predictions.  
In line with the NEG hypotheses, our results show that both agglomeration economies 
and market potential play an important role in the location of Spanish multinational firms 
in developing and transition economies. The positive externalities associated with the 
agglomeration effects nevertheless present important differences, depending on the 
nationality of the firms located in the same place. The cost and quality of labour, the 
availability of physical infrastructures and a favourable business environment also appear 
to be important determinants for Spanish firms when d ciding where to locate their 
affiliates in developing and transition economies. Finally, our findings reveal a specific 
regional component and the presence of substitution patterns among alternative locations, 
this latter confirming the appropriateness of the MXL estimation.  
                                                          
2 The assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives imposed by traditional models of discrete 
choice assumes that the probability of choosing betwe n two alternative options does not depend on the 
characteristics of the other alternatives. That is, all the alternatives are equally substitutive each other. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature 
concerning the location determinants of multinational firms. Section 3 describes the 
dataset and the econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and 
the final section concludes.  
2.- RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON MNEs AND FDI LOCATION 
DETERMINANTS 
The theoretical literature highlights the idea that host country characteristics that 
multinational firms will find most attractive depends on the motives of the foreign 
investors.3 In this same line, the most relevant empirical research on the location 
determinants of foreign investments focuses on hostc untry characteristics such as the 
size and quality of the host market, the endowment of atural resources or geographical 
proximity to consumers.4 Other studies (Blomström and Kokko, 2002; Noorbakhsh et al., 
2001) also test to what extent the availability of human capital (skilled versus non-skilled 
workers, together with the costs involved) influencs location choices. 
Recently, additional factors from the developments of the NEG theory related to the 
forces that favour the concentration or dispersion of economic activity have become 
commonplace in the literature on the determinants of he location decisions of MNEs and 
FDI.5 In our view, this literature makes two major contributions to the study of location 
decisions of MNEs, i.e. it stresses the importance of agglomeration economies, and it 
retrieves the concept of market potential. In accordance with the market-seeking FDI 
hypothesis,6 many works support a positive association between th  market size of the 
host economy and foreign investment inflows (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Kang and Jiang, 
2012). However, according to Head and Mayer (2004) and the new developments of the 
NEG, while the ability to access a foreign market at little cost motivates firms to locate 
                                                          
3 Faeth (2009) and Basile and Kayam (2015) include exc llent surveys on theoretical FDI models. 
4 Blonigen (2005) or more recently Basile and Kayam (2015) provide exhaustive overviews of the empirical 
literature. 
5
 Since the seminal work of Krugman (1991a, b) various a thors have contributed to the development of 
the NEG model. Krugman (1999), Neary (2001) and Fujita and Thisse (2002), for example, include 
excellent reviews on the NEG theory and its contribu ion to different fields of economics. 
6 Brainard (1997). 
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production in that country, the ability to enter other markets from that country also 
matters.7  
The empirical literature has also dealt extensively with the importance of agglomeration 
economies and the dynamic process generating industrial clusters. Particularly, the 
following studies provide evidence on agglomeration economies: Barrel and Pain (1999) 
and Head and Mayer (2004) for US and Japanese firms inve ting in Europe, respectively; 
Barrios et al. (2006) for FDI in Ireland; Disdier and Mayer (2004) and Procher (2011) for 
French firms locating abroad; Hilber and Voicu (2010) for Romania; Majocchi and 
Pressuti (2009) for FDI in Italy; Pusterla and Resmini (2007) for the EEC region; and 
Spies (2010) for multinational firms in Germany. 
This literature states that the attractiveness of a country is a function not only of market 
access but also of the existence of information spillovers arising from industrial 
agglomerations (Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Mariotti et al., 2010). Head et al. (1999) pointed 
out that, all other things being equal, foreign investors will prefer locations chosen by 
preceding investors. For Barry et al. (2003), firms ight be further attracted by the 
presence of existing firms, as the agglomeration of companies is sending out signals to 
new investors about the reliability of the host country. Agglomeration effects might also 
be capturing the intensity of competition. Accordingly, the increase in the number of firms 
operating in a market may have a negative impact on the attractiveness of this place 
through increased competition. Which of these two effects dominates seems to be more 
of an empirical question than a theoretical one. 
Besides, Alfaro and Chen (2014, 2016) recently pointed out that the agglomeration 
patterns of foreign subsidiaries of MNEs are different from those of domestic firms. These 
authors find that foreign affiliate patterns are relat d both to the number of firms and to 
their country of origin. For Crozet et al. (2004), depending on the country of origin, 
positive spillovers from clustering between firms can be more or less pronounced. In 
particular, they found that for firms investing in France, the agglomeration effects among 
firms with the same nationality are much higher than with foreign firms. Similar outcomes 
                                                          
7
 Other authors that show the relevance of market potential in the location decision of foreign firms include 
Basile et al. (2008), Chang et al. (2014), Crozet et al. (2004), Pusterla and Resmini (2007) and Procher 




were found by Chang et al. (2011) for Japanese and T iwanese multinational firms in 
China. These results agree with what Head et al. (1995) defined as the “follow-the-leader” 
pattern of multinational firms. By analysing Japanese firms investing in the USA, these 
authors showed that, for these firms, the effect of previous Japanese investments in terms 
of attractiveness exceeds that of prior US investmen s.8  
Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Chang et al. (2014) showed that the decision on where to 
locate foreign affiliates also depends on the proximity to the investor’s home country. 
According to these authors, a shorter geographical d stance results in a lower fixed entry 
cost because of the decreased costs of communications and of dealing with cultural 
differences. Blonigen and Wang (2005), however, pointed out that greater distances not 
only make the control of overseas investment more difficult but also increase trade costs, 
and therefore the net effect of increasing distance between parent and host countries is 
ambiguous. Additionally, for the Spanish case, we also need to take into consideration 
the fact that physical distance does not necessarily match cultural distance, as a number 
of distant countries, such as those in Latin America (LA), share a similar language and a 
common history with Spain. Drogenkijk and Martín (2015), for example, identified 
cultural proximity as the most important driver of FDI in LA for Spanish firms. 
The literature on efficiency-seeking FDI has also highlighted relative factor abundance 
as another important aspect in explaining the geographical distribution of FDI.9 In the 
empirical literature researchers have used several proxies to take this factor into account. 
Perhaps the most widely used have been the input costs or the endowment of skilled 
labour. For Kinoshita and Campos (2003), if foreign nvestors segment part of their 
production process internationally to benefit from low labour costs, the availability of 
cheap labour is an important stimulus for the locati n of foreign firms. Moreover, since 
the theoretical contribution by Lucas (1990) concering the importance of human capital 
on FDI flows to less developed countries, many empirical studies have found evidence of 
the role that the availability of skilled labour plays as a determinant for FDI (see 
Gauselmann and Marek, 2012; Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; Zhang, 2001, among others). 
                                                          
8
 However, contrary to this literature, Procher (2011) concluded that the nationality of firms within a given 
cluster plays only a minor role. According to her findings, the agglomeration effects are not restricted to 
the clusters of home country firms, as the agglomeration of firms from other nationalities yields similar 
results as regards the attractiveness of a location. 
9 See Zhang and Markusen (1999). 
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Recent empirical works have also identified macroeconomic stability or the availability 
and quality of different kinds of infrastructures as encouraging factors for FDI, especially 
for developing and transition economies. As Busse and Hefeker (2007), Demekas et al. 
(2007), Mina (2012) and Zhang (2001) stated, MNEs prefer to invest in countries with 
higher stability at the macro level, as this increases the economic security and business 
opportunities. Besides, for some authors, better access to infrastructures provides an 
important stimulus for the location of foreign affiliates by MNEs (see Asiedu, 2002; 
Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Coughlin and Segev, 2000). Similarly, for Kinda (2010), 
problems with physical infrastructures (included telecommunications restrictions) 
discourage FDI in developing countries.  
However, the incentives for the location of foreign affiliates come not only from physical 
or hard infrastructures, but also from the so-called soft infrastructures. Hard 
infrastructures include roads, motorways, information and communication technologies 
(ICT), etc., while soft infrastructures are those related to a transparent legal system, stable 
institutions, domestic regulations, and so forth.10 In this line, Busse and Hefeker (2007), 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Kinoshita and Campos (2003), 
Kang and Jiang (2012) and Mina (2012) have confirmed the negative influence of 
corruption on the location of FDI in developing countries.11  
3.- DATA AND THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
a. Data and variables 
 
In this paper we use data from the Investment Map database.12 This database provides 
firm-level data about foreign affiliates of multinational firms and the location of their 
facilities. More specifically, our empirical analysis uses information on the location 
choice of 4,177 foreign affiliates of 826 Spanish parent companies located in 52 
                                                          
10 See Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2010) for a definitio  of hard and soft infrastructures.  
11 However, other authors, such as Barassi and Zhou (2012), show a positive impact of corruption on FDI, 
thus providing support to the existence of the “helping-hand” role of corruption. 
12 International Trade Center (UNCTAD and WTO), 2011. 
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developing and transition countries from 1990 to 2010.13 Figure 1 shows the geographical 
distribution of these affiliates.14  
Figure 1. Distribution of Spanish foreign affiliates in developing and transition countries, 
1990-2010. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Investment Map database (ITC, 2011). 
 
We observe that Latin America attracts a large percentage of offshore Spanish 
multinationals (Figure 1), the most attractive destinations being Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina. Additionally, we appreciate that size matters as a location determinant. Thus, 
large economies attract quite a significant number of Spanish affiliates, which is 
consistent with the predictions of the NEG theory. In Central and Eastern European 
countries, they are mainly located in Romania, Poland nd Turkey. For Asia and Africa 
we find that most of the affiliates in each of these regions are concentrated in only one 
country, namely China, in the case of Asia, and Morocco, in the case of Africa.   
Consistent with previous literature, in the empirical analysis, as factors that may 
encourage or deter the location of MNEs, we have considered country characteristics 
related to the size and quality of the host and surrounding markets, including 
agglomeration forces, geographical proximity, labour market features and the local 
                                                          
13 Note, however, that although we have a period of 20 years, the year the different affiliates were 
established is unknown. Therefore, our dataset has a cross-sectional rather than a panel data structure. 
14 In Figure A.1 in the Appendix, we further show the exact number of Spanish foreign affiliates (and their 
percentages) across countries. 
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business environment. Table 1 below shows all the explanatory variables (their 
definitions, sources and their expected signs).  
Table 1. Definitions of the explanatory variables and their sources. 





Natural logarithm of Hoover’s 
location index for Spanish firms in the 
host country j over the period 1990-
2010. 
Own elaboration based on the Investment 
Map database (International Trade Center, 





Natural logarithm of Hoover’s 
location index for foreign firms in the 
host country j over the period 1990-
2010. 
Own elaboration based on the Investment 






Natural logarithm of GDP of the host 
country j and adds the GDP of all 
surrounding countries weighted by the 
Euclidean distance between major 
cities in the host and surrounding 
countries (billions). 
Own elaboration (the GDP is obtained 






Distance Natural logarithm of bilateral distance 
between the main cities in the home 
country (thousands of km). 
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 




GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
in the host country j (thousands). 
World Development Indicators (World 





Natural logarithm of compensation of 
employees, which consists of all 
payments in cash, and contributions to 
government social insurance and 
pension schemes that provide 
employees with benefits. 
World Development Indicators (World 







Natural logarithm of non-income HDI 
in the host country j. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) is a 
summary measure of average 
achievement in key dimensions of 
human development: a long and 
healthy life, knowledge and the 
standard of living. 




Road density Natural logarithm of road density (km 
of road per sq. km of land area) in the 
host country j. 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank database, 2012). 
 
+ 
ICT Natural logarithm of total number of 
internet users in the host country j (per 
100 people). 
World Development Indicators (World 





Captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption. Higher 
values of this variable represent a 
higher degree of control of corruption 
in the host country j. 
World Governance Indicators (World 
Bank, 2010). 
+ 
Inflation rate Natural logarithm of inflation rate in 
the host country j. 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank database, 2012). 
 
- 
Note: Hoover’s localization coefficient was computed as follows:  = 
 ∑ 	
∑  ∑ ∑ 	
 , where 
  is the number of 
foreign firms from country h in country j. If  > 1, then country j has a share of foreign firms from country h that 





As mentioned earlier, agglomeration effects have usually been measured in empirical 
works by the total number of firms in a region or sector (see, for instance, Head et al., 
2002, and Disdier and Mayer, 2004). However, according to Pusterla and Resmini (2007), 
the absolute measure of the total number of foreign affiliates might not be controlling for 
other relevant effects related with agglomeration patterns. Similarly, Head et al. (2002) 
showed that the use of an absolute measure of agglomeration may lead to the collection 
of the same effect as other demand variables. Taking these considerations into account, 
here we employ Hoover’s location index as a relative measure of agglomeration. 
Moreover, we elaborated this index separately for Spanish-owned and foreign-owned 
affiliates in order to analyse the sensitivity of the agglomeration spillovers to the 
nationality of firms (see Table 1 for more details). 
Like most of the empirical literature on location choice (see, among others, the work by 
Chang et al., 2014; Crozet, 2004; and Spies, 2010), the market potential of country j 
(MKPj) is calculated here in accordance with Harris (1954) as GDPj + Σj≠k(GDPk/distjk). 
This expression captures both the size of the host market and its attractiveness as a means 
to access other nearby markets. We have also included the distance (distij) between (the 
capital cities of) the home and the host countries in our model as an explanatory 
variable.15 This variable attempts to control for both the transportation costs and the 
transaction costs that arise from cultural differences and unfamiliarity with the legal 
framework (Chang et al., 2014; Disdier and Mayer, 2004). In our case, however, the vast 
distance from Spain to countries that are most likely to have more cultural similarities, as 
is the case of LA economies, means that this latter si uation is not necessarily true.16  
Moving on to an efficiency-seeking motivation behind the location of MNEs, here we 
capture the influence of the relative factor abundance by the GDP per capita of the host 
country. Although much of the empirical literature on this issue uses data on labour costs, 
the lack of data for many of the countries considere  has led us to use GDP per capita 
instead.17 Other studies that use GDP per capita as a proxy of lab ur cost to analyse the 
                                                          
15 Given that the information about the cities where the headquarters are located is not available, we cannot 
capture the effects of firm headquarters, as suggested by an anonymous referee. 
16 We initially included (besides distance) a dummy variable for language (equal to one for Spanish-
speaking countries, and zero otherwise). However, this variable was not significant in any regression 
(results are available upon request). 
17 The Global Wage Report of the International Labour Organization (2008) states that, despite the efforts, 
“the wage data for developing countries remain incomplete (and) the quality of the data is also an issue”, 
p.10. More specifically, this dataset provides data for labour cost for only 22 of the 52 countries considered 
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location determinants of FDI include Mayer et al. (2010) and Nefussi and Schwellnus 
(2010). 
Although the measure of GDP per capita is imperfect, there is some evidence of the 
existence of a high correlation between relative factor endowments and per capita income, 
especially in the case of developing countries. As Debaere (2003) has found, there is a 
strong association between GDP per capita and the ratios of capital-labour, skilled-
unskilled labour, and capital-unskilled labour, and this association is especially 
significant for the North-South group of countries considered.  
Additionally, and as a robustness check, we have employed the compensation of 
employees to measure labour cost (see the definition of this variable in Table 1). 
However, the use of this variable is not free from li itations: by leaving many relevant 
destination countries (such as Argentina, Mexico and China) out of our analysis, some 
questions have already been raised as to the representativeness of the sample. Indeed, the 
lack of information for this variable in these economies reduces our sample by more than 
43% of the total number of observations. 
The use of GDP per capita to proxy the relative factor ost in the location choice of FDI 
has also been questioned, since this variable may further capture the greater attractiveness 
of wealthy countries or a skilled labour force. However, since our analysis also includes 
other variables from the demand side, such as market pot ntial, here GDP per capita is 
expected to represent the higher labour costs of the host markets. Moreover, we have also 
controlled for labour quality. Specifically, we quantify the beneficial impact that a greater 
availability of skilled labour has on the location decision of multinational firms by 
including the non-income Human Development Index (HDI), published by UNDP 
(2011). This is a composite index that combines indicators of educational attainment and 
life expectancy, and hence a greater value of this index is related with a higher value of 
skilled labour.  
We include two variables to capture for the quality of physical (hard) infrastructures: road 
density and ICT (proxied by the total numbers of inter et users) of the destination 
countries. The effect of these two determinants on the location choice of multinational 
                                                          
in our analysis and it has information for 2010 for only 13 of them. Indeed, for many relevant countries 
(like Chile, Poland and China) there is no data on labour costs in any of the periods considered. 
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firms is expected to be positive. Besides, to control for macroeconomic determinants, we 
use a corruption index variable and the inflation rate as proxies for the quality of 
institutions and macroeconomic stability. Better institutions and a stable economic 
climate are both assumed to improve the business framework and to thus encourage firms 
to locate in the country under consideration, especially when this is a developing or 
transition economy (as is our case). We report some descriptive statistics of the different 
explanatory variables in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
b. Estimation methodology 
In this paper, we estimate the determinants of the location choice for foreign affiliates by 
Spanish multinational firms by means of a mixed logit model. As in the traditional 
conditional logit model, here the dependent variable () represents the binary response 
of firms’ location decision. In particular, takes the value of one when the multinational 
firms choose country j to locate affiliate i and zero for other alternative locations. 
However, in contrast to the conditional logit model, the MXL allows us to capture any 
substitution pattern among alternative destinations, thus taking into account the 
possibility that unobserved factors make some destinations closer substitutes. Hence, by 
using this novel methodology, we seek to bring the model more into line with reality than 
most commonly used discrete choice models. 
Mixed logit models base on a random utility (profits) maximization (RUM) framework. 
In this case, each investor selects an alternative location among a set of mutually exclusive 
locations according to its profit function. Then, we can represent the expected profit of 
firm i for a location j, , as a linear discrete choice model: 
 =  +  (1) 
 
where  is a vector of explanatory variables that are observed by firm i and includes 
host country characteristics that have an impact on the expected profits of the firm;  
captures the influence of unobservable factors on afirm’s location decision; and  is a 
vector of coefficients.  
According to the RUM hypothesis, the firm that knows the value of  and  for all 
alternatives will choose the location that will yield it the highest profit. That is, firm j will 
13 
 
choose location i if and only if  > ∀ ≠  = 1, ⋯ ,  . Then, the probability of firm 
j investing in location i can be expressed as: 
" = #$ > %∀ ≠  = 1, ⋯ ,   (2) 
 
Given the stochastic nature of the profits function – as it depends partly on unobserved 
factors (the researcher observes the Xs but not  and ) – we need to make an assumption 
about the distribution of the unobserved part in order to calculate the probability that a 
firm will select a particular destination to invest in.  
The traditional conditional logit model assumes that e & are constant for all firms (thus 
excluding the possibility of preference variations) and that the error term is independently 
and identically distributed (IID), with type I extreme value distribution, which imposes 
the property of independence of irrelevance alternaives, IIA, (McFadden, 1974). 
According to this property, a change in the characteristics of one location should alter the 
probability of choosing alternative locations proportionally.18 However, this fails if 
certain unobserved characteristics exist that make diff rent locations more competitive 
with each other. The unobserved attributes may cause correlation in the unobserved part 
of profits across alternatives, which violates the IID assumption. In this case, the 
conditional logit estimates would be biased, even when country-specific effects are 
considered, as shown by Herriges and Kling (1997).19  
The mixed logit model overcomes these limitations by allowing correlations in 
unobserved factors.20 Specifically, by relaxing the IIA assumption, MXL makes it 
possible to estimate complex substitution patterns that stem from the unobserved 
similarities and differences among alternative locati ns, thereby accounting for the 
possibility that firms perceive some alternatives as being more similar to one another.  
The probability of choosing an alternative location in the mixed logit model can be 
derived under two behavioural specifications: random parameter specification and error 
components setup. Each of these two derivations provides a particular interpretation of 
                                                          
18 The IIA assumes that the ratio of the probability of investing in country A over the probability of investing 
in country B is independent of the attributes of any other location. See Browstone and Train (1999). 
19 Similarly, although the nested logit model partly relaxes the IID assumption by allowing some correlation 
between alternatives within the same mutually exclusive groups (nests), it imposes this condition among 
alternative destinations between groups.  
20 Hensher and Greene (2003) provides a more detailed explanation about mixed logit models. 
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the MXL model. Under a random parameter specification, the values of i represent the 
preference of the firms (Train, 2002). In this case, th  i coefficients from Eq. (1) are 
treated as random parameters instead of fixed parameters (thus encompassing preference 
heterogeneity among firms). In the error components setup, instead, the unobserved 
(random) part of the profit function represents substitution patterns over alternatives. 
Random coefficients and error components specifications are formally equivalent when 
Xij and Yij overlap. However, as mentioned above, they provide d ff rent interpretations. 
Given that our goal in this paper is to capture anypotential substitution patterns across 
locations, we focus on estimating the correlations across alternatives through an error 
components approach.21  
Accordingly, we specify the profits function as a combination of the IID extreme value 
error term of the conditional logit, uit, and another distribution (mixing distribution) tha  
induces heteroskedasticity and correlation across altern tives (thus relaxing the IIA 
assumption). More particularly, the profit from location j is modelled as:  
 = ' + () + *+ (3) 
 
where Yij is a vector of observed variables of each location choice, ' is a vector of fixed 
coefficients and )i is a vector of randomly distributed parameters with density g(.) over 
all firms.22 In this model, the variances of the error components capture the magnitude of 
the correlations and, hence, the different substitution patterns among alternatives. 
Specifically, a value of this variance other than zero indicates that firms perceive the 
different regions as closer substitutes for location in terms of the observed attribute.  
An advantage of the MXL model is that any element may be included in the random term, 
which allows us to endogenously identify those factors hat make the different countries 
closer substitutes for the location of foreign affiliates.23 In fact, contrary to the nested logit 
                                                          
21 However, it is important to note that, as mentioned by Train (2002), regardless of the motivation, the 
mixing distribution is indeed capturing variance and correlations in unobserved factors. In fact we have  
mixture of random coefficients and an error component s tup. 
22 In this paper, we have assumed that the distribution of g(.), mixing distribution, is normal, with mean h 
and covariance W. Alternatively, we could specify g(.) to be discrete (latent class model) or use data 
segmentation strategies. However, the challenge of these last strategies consists in picking the right number 
of points (latent classes) on the distribution or segmentation criteria (Hensher and Greene, 2003). 
23 McFadden and Train (2000) demonstrated that MXL can be specified to approximate any discrete choice 
model derived from random utility maximization (to an arbitrary degree of closeness) with the appropriate 
choices of g and Y. 
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model, which relies on a particular nesting structure, an MXL model enables us to obtain 
any substitution pattern among alternatives by making the appropriate choice of variables 
that enter the error components, Yj. 
Specifically, the unconditional probability of choosing destination j in the mixed logit 
model can be obtained by estimating # over all the possible values of ).24 Thus, a mixed 
logit probability is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at different values 
of ), with the weights given by the density g(.). With non-zero error components, profits 
are thus correlated over alternative locations. 
# = , -
./01231/41
∑ -./0123/415673
8) ∨ ℎ, ; <) (4) 
 
This equation, however, has no closed-form solution, and therefore it must be solved 
through simulation.25 In this work, we have specified different mixed logit models to 
endogenously determine what leads Spanish firms to view locations as being more similar 
in the competition to attract foreign investors.26  
4.- MAIN RESULTS 
Table 2 below presents the outcomes for the estimation of the MXL models. In this table, 
the endogenous variable represents the binary response f firm’s location decision. We 
show both the estimate coefficients and the standard eviation of the error term for the 
different variables (bottom part of the table), this latter capturing the potential correlation 
across alternatives in terms of the different local factors.
                                                          
24 The standard logit model is in fact a special case of the mixed logit when g(.) is degenerated at fixed 
parameters, thus implying no correlation in profits across alternatives. It is also possible to gain a nested 
logit model from the MXL specification by defining Yij as a vector of dummy variables, which are equal to 
one when the alternative j is in nest k and zero otherwise (see Brownstone and Train, 1998). 
25 The results reported in this work are from 1000 random draws. 
26 In this work, we implemented mixed logit estimation by a STATA package developed by Hole (2007). 
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Table 2. Mixed logit estimations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Spanish Agglo. 5.062 (0.899)*** 4.001 (0.599)*** 3.320 (0.718)*** 4.287 (0.830)*** 4.388 (0.662)*** 4.427 (0.928)*** 4.086 (0.619)*** 2.631 (0.669)*** 
Foreign Agglo. 69.462 (14.173)*** 54.266 (11.194)*** 41.813 (11.037)*** 54.460 (13.241)*** 57.532 (12.270)*** 59.375 (14.982)*** 52.204 (11.230)*** 32.843 (10.484)*** 
Market potential 1.306 (0.035)*** 1.341 (0.045)*** 1.358 (0.040)*** 1.295 (0.040)*** 1.401 (0.054)*** 1.157 (0.046)*** 1.403 (0.053)*** 1.304 (0.047)*** 
Distance -0.001 (0.063) -0.042 (0.058) -1.181 (0.160)*** 0.118 (0.081) -0.075 (0.063) 0.226 (0.062)*** -0.063 (0.066) -0.641 (0.156)*** 
GDP per capita -0.018 (0.077)  -0.377 (0.097)*** -0.317 (0.081)***  -0.304 (0.081)***  -0.693 (0.108)*** 
Employee Comp.  -0.121 (0.011)***   -0.115 (0.013)***  -0.111 (0.014)***  
Non-income HDI 3.712 (0.569)*** 4.019 (0.361)*** 3.979 (0.588)*** 3.134 (0.526)*** 4.888 (0.525)*** 2.780 (0.515)*** 4.795 (0.524)*** 3.100 (0.601)*** 
Hard Infra.         
  Road density    0.091 (0.032)*** .0127 (0.030)*** 0.083 (0.032)*** 0.126 (0.032)*** 0.143 (0.032)*** 
  ICT    0.461 (0.100)*** -0.200 (0.086)* 0.416 (0.099)*** -0.198 (0.093)* 0.122 (0.064)* 
Soft Infra.         
  Contr. Corrupt.    0.425 (0.071)*** -0.081 (0.113) 0.258 (0.085)*** -0.099 (0.116) 0.635 (0.097)*** 
Inflation rate      -0.416 (0.074)*** -0.044 (0.089) -0.093 (0.094) 
Asia   1.605 (0.343)***     0.021 (0.434) 
CEE   1.669 (0.353)***     0.832 (0.340)*** 
Latin America   3.740 (0.410)***     2.454 (0.498)*** 
Std. Dev.         
Spanish Agglo. 1.740 (0.462)*** 1.602 (0.325)*** 1.396 (0.377)*** 1.358 (0.453)*** 1.838 (0.355)*** 1.388 (0.496)*** 1.685 (0.344)*** 1.031 (0.357)*** 
Foreign Agglo. 47.938 (7.314)*** 0.037 (3.655) 34.683 (5.619)*** 40.521 (6.868)*** 0.759 (3.956) 44.115 (7.887)*** 0.332 (3.637) 33.574 (5.480)***  
Market potential 0.560 (0.034)*** 0.496 (0.057)*** 0.514 (0.045)*** 0.518 (0.037)*** 0.497 (0.063)*** 0.399 (0.051)*** 0.507 (0.058)*** 0.475 (0.042)*** 
Distance 0.213 (0.134) 0.092 (0.150) 0.238 (0.308) 0.219 (0.201) 0.079 (0.146) 0.101 (0.120) 0.105 (0.468) 0.141 (0.405) 
GDP per capita 0.076 (0.088)  0.130 (0.110) 0.043 (0.088)  0.044 (0.092)  0.055 (0.073) 
Employee Comp.  0.002 (0.006)   0.001 (0.008)  0.003 (0.007)  
Non-income HDI 2.711 (0.382)*** 4.019 (0.361)*** 4.620 (0.425)*** 1.836 (0.900)** 3.306 (0.425) 1.893 (0.728)*** 3.220 (0.539)*** 2.541 (0.782)*** 
Hard Infra.         
  Road density    0.004 (0.028) 0.007 (0.014) 0.004 (0.029) 0.001 (0.014) 0.007 (0.016) 
  ICT    0.557 (0.194)*** 0.021 (0.071) 0.463 (0.215)** 0.154 (0.104) 0.029 (0.068) 
Soft Infra.         
  Contr. Corrupt.    0.086 (0.152) 0.131 (0.199) 0.177 (0.268) 0.020 (0.207) 0.412 (0.201) 
Inflation rate      0.041 (0.043) 0.008 (0.048) 0.075 (0.081) 
Asia   0.131 (0.208)     0.225 (0.263) 
CEE   0.890 (0.762)     0.051 (0.332) 
Latin America   0.454 (0.862)     0.453 (0.926) 
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Log-likelihood -10020.51 -4950.77 -9906.11 -9924.51 -4938.84 -9910.43 -4940.87 -9807.23 
Number of obs. 217204 100548 217204 217204 100548 217204 100548 217204 




In this table, we first estimate the probability of a multinational firm locating in a country 
by considering both the NEG model factors and other traditional determinants of foreign 
firms’ location, such as distance, labour cost and human capital. We present the results 
for two alternative measures of labour cost: GDP per capita and employee compensation. 
In the first case, we also estimate the different rgional effects for Asia, Latin America, 
and Central and Eastern Europe. However, the drastic reduction in the number of 
observations required to introduce the employee compensation variable (not available for 
many countries in the sample) prevents us from estimating these effects in the latter case. 
Second, we have further considered the role that hard and soft infrastructures and 
macroeconomic stability play in this choice. 
The main results of interest in Table 2 are the estimated parameters related to 
agglomeration forces, market potential, and cost and skills of the labour force. The table 
shows that the estimates confirm the systematic relevance of the variables identified by 
NEG models.27 The coefficients on the concentration of foreign-owned firms and 
Spanish-owned firms are both positive and significant in every regression. These results 
reveal that, for Spanish multinational firms, the positive spillovers from the 
agglomeration of firms more than offset the negative impact of increased competition. 
However, contrary to the results obtained by Crozet et al. (2004) for French firms, in the 
case of Spanish firms, the spillovers arising from a clustering of foreign-owned firms are 
greater than those coming from clusters of Spanish-owned firms. This suggests that, for 
Spanish investors, on average, the existence of a large number of Spanish firms in a given 
country is viewed not only as a signal of the profitab lity of a certain location but also as 
an indicator of stronger competition. This centrifugal force derived from the increased 
competition due to the clustering of firms seems, however, to be lower in the case of 
foreign-owned affiliates.  
Our results also reveal that affiliates of Spanish multinational firms concentrate in 
countries with higher market potential, which is in agreement with a location choice 
driven by market access motivation. The coefficient o  this variable is positive and 
strongly significant in all regressions. Similar results are obtained when, as a robustness 
                                                          
27 In these regressions, the sign of the parameters can be interpreted as the direction of the influence of the 
variable. That is, if a coefficient (βj) is greater than zero, we can say that the probability of choosing a 
destination is an increasing function of the associated variable (Xj). However, the absolute value of the 
parameters is meaningless, as the marginal effect o Xj depends on Xj.  
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analysis, we estimate the model for Latin America and the CEE separately (Table A.2 in 
the Appendix shows these regressions).28 Furthermore, we observe that after controlling 
for the potential regional effects, the influence of distance on the location of Spanish firms 
in foreign markets becomes negative and significant.29 These findings allow us to 
highlight the significant presence of horizontal FDI or market-seeking motivation in the 
offshore activity of Spanish multinationals. 
Additionally, and consistent with an efficiency-seeking FDI, the estimates show that a 
negative impact of labour cost on the probability of locating a foreign affiliate remains 
across regressions. Both GDP per capita and employee compensation present a negative 
and significant coefficient in all cases. This confirms the harmful influence of higher 
labour costs in the attraction of investment flows, a  shown in previous works (see, for 
instance, Mayer et al., 2010, and Nefussi and Schwellnus, 2010).30   
Concerning the impact of human capital on the locati n choice of multinational firms, we 
find that the coefficient on the non-income HDI is positive and strongly significant in all 
cases. Therefore, as expected, we can say that skills exert a beneficial influence on the 
probability of developing and transition economies being attractive to Spanish firms. 
Gauselmann and Marek (2012) obtained a similar result for the location of multinational 
firms in post-transition regions. 
Our results also confirm the importance of taking ito consideration the role played by 
infrastructures and the macroeconomic background. Regardless of the measurement, the 
availability of physical infrastructures appears to be an important factor in explaining the 
location of multinational firms, as derived from the estimates in Columns 4, 6 and 8 (when 
all destination countries under analysis are included). A similar conclusion is highlighted 
in the works by Coughlin and Segev (2000), Chan et al. (2014), and Chen and Kwan 
(2000). Likewise, the institutional framework seems to exert an important influence on 
the location choice. In line with Busse and Hefeker (2007), Diez et al. (2016), Globerman 
                                                          
28 Given that most of the Spanish affiliates in Asia and Africa are concentrated in one single country (China 
and Morocco, respectively), it is not possible to estimate the model for these areas separately.  
29 Conversely, if we divide the sample by regions (as in Table A.2 in the Appendix), distance seems to have 
a positive influence on the location of FDI. This is probably because when we focus on destination coutries 
within the same region, physical distance is more closely related with cultural distance than when we 
consider destination countries between different regions. 
30 The lower variability shown by per capita GDP among the countries within the different regions would 
justify their lack of significance when we estimate th  model separately for LA and CEE, as shown in Table 
A.2 in the Appendix. 
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and Shapiro (2002) and Mina (2012), among others, the estimated coefficients on the 
control of corruption variable for the whole sample indicate that the probability of a 
Spanish multinational firm choosing a certain location increases with the quality of the 
institutions. These outcomes, however, do not hold when we reduce the sample to include 
the employee compensation variable. Nonetheless, although this is probably a better 
measure of labour cost, the drastic reduction of the sample, in general, and the elimination 
of important destination countries for the Spanish MNEs, in particular, lead us to be 
cautious when interpreting the results from these rgressions. 
As expected, macroeconomic instability seems to deter Spanish investments in 
developing and transition economies, although this re ult is not very robust. The 
coefficient on inflation rate is only significant when we include all the countries and we 
consider the regional effects.  
We also found the expected regional effects on the location decision of MNEs (see 
Columns 3 and 8). According to our estimates, Spanish multinational firms have a greater 
propensity to invest in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe than in Asia or 
Africa, regardless of the observed attributes. In the first case, as mentioned previously, 
this can be explained by the cultural ties between Spain and LA and hence by the greater 
access of Spanish firms to these countries. 
Finally, the estimation of standard deviations of the error terms in the MXL models 
corroborates the existence of complex substitution patterns among alternative locations 
(as shown at the bottom of Table 2). Particularly, the statistical significance of these 
variables reflects the idea that Spanish multinatiol firms find closer substitutes, in terms 
of location choice, in those countries that share similar market potential, agglomeration 
forces, human capital and ITC. However, distance, road density and macroeconomic 
stability do not seem to be relevant characteristics in the substitution pattern for Spanish 
foreign investments. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
In recent decades, Spanish FDI in developing and transition economies has increased 
considerably. Taking this fact into account and bearing in mind that the reasons driving 
investments in these economies may differ from those in developed countries, in this work 
we analyse what factors drive the offshore localization of Spanish MNEs in developing 
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and transition economies. A better understanding of the role played by these factors can 
indeed guide policies of recipient economies aimed at improving their potential for 
attracting foreign investment inflows. To study this phenomenon empirically, and given 
the availability of firm-level data, we use a mixed logit model, which makes it possible 
to consider complex patterns of substitution among alternative destinations. 
Our results show that, in line with the NEG hypotheses, both agglomeration economies 
and market potential play an important role in the location decision of Spanish foreign 
investment in developing and transition economies. However, different magnitudes of the 
agglomeration economies are obtained for the clustering of foreign-owned firms and 
Spanish-owned firms, the latter showing a lower effect. This suggests that, in spite of the 
positive effect that an increased number of foreign f rms located in a host country can 
have on the location decision, the deterrence effect associated with more competition is 
greater for Spanish firms than for firms from other countries. 
In addition to geographic factors, we find that thebusiness framework also matters for 
the location choices of Spanish multinationals. Thus, aspects related to the business 
environment, including the cost and quality of labour, the availability of physical 
infrastructures, the institutional background or macroeconomic stability, are also relevant. 
These factors are obviously of special relevance in policy-making, as they can be affected 
by the national government. In this regard, our findings reinforce the idea that in 
developing and transition countries a set of policies that broadly benefit the local business 
conditions will promote the location of multinational firms and hence the effects derived 
from higher foreign investment.  
Our estimates further reveal the positive influence of cultural similarities and lower sunk 
costs on the location of Spanish multinational firms, as shown by their greater propensity 
to invest in LA and CEE countries. Finally, the result  confirm the advisability of using 
a mixed logit model. We find that some degree of correlation in the unobserved part of 
the profits from investing in different countries does exist. This gives rise to substitution 
patterns among different locations as a result of the combination of diverse attributes such 
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